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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we utilize a panel of oil dependent economies from 2000 to 
2015 and attempt to empirically examine the relationship between crude oil 
rents and fiscal balance, while controlling for other covariates. Our strategy 
is to highlight the importance of fiscal rules by using an instrumental variable 
approach based on Dynamic Panel estimators [the General Method of 
Moment (GMM)]. This is used in comparison with estimations from pooled 
OLS, LSDV fixed effects, and the IV/2SLS techniques (using each country’s 
share of world output as instrument). Our pre-estimation diagnostics showed 
that the GMM approach might not be applicable to the small sample, and we 
suspected that the IV/2SLS method might also be weak in testing our 
hypothesis for the oil dependent economies; therefore we maintained the 
LSDV Fixed effects estimations. Our estimation results shows that in 
countries with fiscal rules, there is insignificant reaction of fiscal balance to 
changes in oil rents shocks, and the impact is weak. We find also that welfare 
spending, which was captured by the real GDP per capita, affects fiscal 
balance, and so does the budgetary variable, i.e. debt-to-GDP ratio, and the 
ability of the government to curb corruption and mismanagement of funds, 
which is politically motivated.
 
Contribution/ Originality 
This study contributes to existing literature on natural resource rents and its effects on fiscal balance for 
natural resource-endowed economies. The paper's primary contribution is to find that the GMM-IV 
approach is potent in solving endogeneity of crude oil rents, and that the structure of primary fiscal balance 
differs with natural resource endowments. Also, having fiscal rule matters less with high perception of 
corruption index and weak political structure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the fundamental macroeconomic objectives of the government is to achieve increased growth 
of its gross domestic product (GDP), and expand economic activities. However, in recent times, annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices has declined in many countries, or at best, remain 
stable. On the global trend, it has struggled to roam around 3%, as shown in figure 1. The downward 
trend of growth rates respond to changes in the components of the gross value added by producers of 
goods and services currently operating in the economy1. Among several variables that interact with 
growth, there is a direct relationship between budget balance (deficits) and economic growth. This 
relationship derives from high investment costs that is usually not properly optimized or modeled in 
budget decisions in most countries (Arjomand et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP growth (annual %) 
 
In view of the link between investment costs, as correlates of revenue in determining fiscal balance, 
therefore, one budgetary item that matters for economic growth in oil rich economies is oil rents. Oil 
rents are basically revenue less costs, and posits a clear picture of an oil dependent country’s oil wealth, 
as compared with oil production volumes. Thus, among several budget items, government’s gross 
revenue is largely sensitive to changes in crude oil price, and attracts consequences for overall 
economy in the presence of shocks. Past studies have clamored for less dependence on oil-related tax-
revenues, and for more investment in high technology, so as to establish an exogenous and genuine 
driver of economic growth (Azhgaliyeva, 2014; Reyes-Loya and Blanco, 2008). 
 
In addition, irrespective of foreign and domestic debt levels, a country with a drive for favourable 
fiscal balance, is likely to stand strong in the face of an oil shock, hence such country is referred to as 
been fiscally sustainable. A favourable fiscal balance is however made possible when there are active 
fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are used as devices to mitigate against improper behaviour of major fiscal 
variables, such as revenue, expenditure, and procedures or volumes of new debts. It is usually set for 
a time frame, and yields potential consequences if not adhered to by fiscal authorities. 
 
Fiscal balance determinants in most countries, and its link with economic growth remains an important 
area of fiscal policy and public finance, and it requires further study, especially for oil rich countries. 
This is because oil rich countries tend to borrow for recurrent spending, amazingly during oil peaks, 
as contrasted to standard expectations. The rising trend in government debt over the last decade is 
quite alarming. This is because debt is an important component of fiscal balance, and debt-to-GDP 
                                                 
1 World Bank Database, and OECD National Accounts 
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ratio has been on increase (Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012), which results in rising deficits in 
turn. 
 
The paradox between international crude oil price peak seasons, rising crude oil revenue and falling 
fiscal balance (or rising budget deficits) is somewhat established and investigated as not just 
economically motivated, but also politically motivated. Although, there are several macroeconomic 
models that incorporate government’s optimizing behaviour, these models only explain fiscal balance 
partially; therefore, it is reasonable to consider the challenges of political management by the 
government. This is owing to some tendencies for huge deficits, when the government is weak, due to 
the structure of the government (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
 
Since the 2014 to 2015 crude oil price fall, its effects on fiscal sustainability have not been accounted 
for, given that most oil dependent countries suffered some level of fiscal crisis, ranging from weak 
fiscal stimulus, increased borrowing, and inability to meet up with very basic public financial 
obligations, amongst others. This paper thus serves as supportive evidence, and uses recent data to 
investigate the relationship among these variables vis-à-vis, oil rents, debt-to-GDP, and real GDP per 
capita. The paper clearly illustrates the effect of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent economies; 
the effect of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent economies with fiscal rules; the role of rising 
welfare spending on fiscal balance; and how the effects of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent 
economies compare with net oil exporting countries. 
 
The effects of oil rents on fiscal balance, in the presence of welfare spending, and no fiscal rule is 
unknown and varies within oil dependent countries. Such information is critical for understanding the 
determinants of fiscal balance for a specific class of countries, and to provide group-specific policy 
recommendations on the use of oil rents in peak periods. It is in line with the above that this study 
focuses on oil dependent economies, as classified by the World Bank. The study also highlights 
important effects for countries with fiscal rules, which in this paper we assume as those countries with 
institutional arrangements that requires prudency in peak periods.  
 
This study will elucidate the effect of oil rents by examining its relationship with welfare spending, 
and corruption index, among other covariates for selected oil dependent economies. In addition, as 
discussed in the previous sections, oil dependent economies benefitted from crude oil price peak in 
late 2014 until mid-2015. These periods also witnessed rising borrowing by many countries, and these 
were used on recurrent expenditures. As such, it provides an ideal sample for this study.  
 
Furthermore, the study will be vital to policy makers in oil dependent economies by helping them to 
understand the need for fiscal rules, and to determine appropriate policy interventions during oil boom 
era, so as to ensure improvement in fiscal balance. Hence, this in future will ultimately safeguard the 
government purse, and budgetary obligations of oil rich countries. 
 
2. THEORY/LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
Unlike in the private sector where objectives are market driven, and resources are influenced by market 
demand, many government budgets and activities are constrained by their resources i.e. mostly funded 
by revenue from tax, or in some cases revenue from natural resources such as crude oil. Activities are 
politically motivated in the latter, and most funding structures are in line with grants, settlements, and 
debts. Therefore, decisions are affected differently by different set of agents; in the private sector we 
have the shareholders, customers, labour force, and the management team; while in the public sector, 
we identify with the people, who are the users of service, and the political office holders. In line with 
this also, budget size is usually large in the public sector, resulting in deficits overtime. 
 
In the USA for example, the federal government has sustained high deficits since the 1980s and 
enjoyed only few years of surpluses, akin to spending on welfare, Medicaid, wars, and other 
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internal/external spending. The effects of deficit on the economy is however a debate in most 
countries, but is usually argued against. Therefore, decisions on the choice of method for financing 
government expenditure, although suggested by the Ricardian equivalence, and other tax smoothening 
hypotheses, is usually a political issue, and may not be appropriately modelled. 
 
2.1.1. Government budget constraint, budget deficits, and fiscal policy 
The basic government budget constraint describes what capacities lie in the government, and this is 
captured by the government’s budget constraint (Romer, 2012). We follow the framework developed 
by Romer (2012), and highlight some modification to the conclusions of the model. Learning from 
household’s individual budget set up, “the present value of its consumption must be less than or equal 
to its initial wealth plus the present value of its labour income”. We follow a similar trend to construct 
the government’s budget constraint: 
 
∫ 𝑒−𝑅(𝑡)𝐺(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 ≤ −𝐷(0) + ∫ 𝑒−𝑅(𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
𝑇(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
∞
𝑡=0
                           … … … … … … (1) 
 
𝑅(𝑡) =  ∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜏                                                                                 … … … … … …  (2)
𝑡
𝜏=0
 
 
The present value of government’s purchases of goods and services must be less than or equal to its 
initial wealth plus the present value of its tax receipts (net of transfer payments), taken as a proxy for 
total government revenue in this baseline model. G(t) and T(t) denote the government’s real purchases 
and taxes at time t, and D(0) is the initial real debt outstanding. 𝑟(𝜏) is the real interest rate at time 
(𝜏). We refer to D(0) as government’s debt rather than wealth, which is negative. 
 
We infer also from the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model on the optimal savings for a society, which 
suggest that household wealth cannot assume a negative value, so is the government debt D(0). Also, 
since the interest rate maintains a positive value, the government cannot pay off its debt. Hence, the 
government is motivated to permanently remain indebted, or even increase its borrowing, since the 
limit of the present value of its debt cannot be positive.  
 
Furthermore, if the government is always borrowing, and uses a fiscal policy where the real interest 
rate exceeds the rate of growth of debt, equation (1) is satisfied and the fiscal balance (government 
budget balance) is negative. Thus, we can pose a frontier definition of fiscal balance, or budget deficit 
as the rate of change of the stock of debt. This rate of change is given as: 
 
D(t) = [G (t) - T (t)] + r (t)D(t)        … … … … … …  (3) 
 
Where equation (3) refers to the rate at which the debt stock changes being equal to revenue less 
expenditure, added to the real interest on the debt stock. Since G(t) – T(t) is usually referred to as the 
government’s primary deficit, we can measure the government’s constraint by focusing on 
performance of fiscal policy.  
 
2.1.2. Modified model  
Focusing on the conventional measures of primary deficits and debt stocks, at a point in time may 
yield misleading measures of actual fiscal performance, therefore it is reasonable to consider the 
present value of the whole expenditure and revenue paths of the government. We can modify the 
preceding equations to accommodate macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, a cogent budgetary 
variable such as oil rents for oil dependent economies, since it accounts for a large portion of revenue, 
and political variable such as corruption index: 
 
B(t) = P(t)[G (t) - T (t) – OR(t)] + i (t )P(t )D(t)     … … … … … … (4) 
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Where P(t) is the price level and i(t) is the nominal interest rate, and if we accommodate nominal and 
real relationships between nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, we find that: 
 .
𝐵(𝑡)
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑡) + 𝜋(𝑡)𝐷(𝑡)                                                               … … … … … … (5) 
 
This means that in as much as the debt stock is positive for any country [D(t)], the conventional or 
nominal primary deficits [B(t)] rises, when the inflation [π(t)] rises, even when it is deflated by the 
price level [P(t)]. Impliedly, when we interact fiscal rules, or introduce other political or 
macroeconomic variables in equation 5, we can capture the response of government’s budget 
constraint, to several variables in an economy, and implicitly understand the behaviour of fiscal 
balance. 
 
2.2. Empirical literature survey 
Given that fiscal policy and monetary policy are important macroeconomic policies that shape the 
economy, and to understand the determinants of budget deficits, and fiscal balance of most countries, 
several researchers have made efforts to grasp the connection between macroeconomic, political, and 
budgetary variables, and budget deficits. They have particularly highlighted the relevance of rising 
debt and falling economic growth performance in determining the fiscal stance of a country.  
 
While some studies showed that interest rates, unemployment rate, economic growth rate, and inflation 
rates, are major determinants of fiscal performance, others highlighted political variables such as fiscal 
autonomy of sub-national government, control of corruption index, and transparency of the budget, as 
significant above all other variables. Consequently, due to consistency and inconsistencies of several 
findings, this paper proceeds to use case studies of oil exporting countries, while highlighting the 
presence or absence of fiscal rules, as a strategy to find out significance or causal effects of several 
class of determinants of fiscal balance. 
 
2.2.1. Literature on determinants of fiscal balance, debt, and growth 
Arjomand et al. (2016) as well as Afonso and Jalles (2013) found a direct link between economic 
growth and variables such as inflation, while noting an indirect relationship between budget deficit 
and debt-to-GDP ratio and also labour productivity. Their findings showed that higher debt maturity 
leads to higher economic growth, which in turn lead to has effects on government’s fiscal performance. 
In other words, at times of financial crisis, there are adverse growth effects, thus efforts to consolidate 
fiscal efforts of the government, and improve on basic debt ratios, are capable of improving total factor 
productivity and also enhance overall growth performance. 
 
In their multivariate regression analysis, covariates such as gross fixed capital formation, public 
investment, Real GDP per capita, and labor productivity were significant but not with expected effects. 
In a similar approach, Baum et al. (2013) found that the effects of debt on the growth rate of GDP in 
the short-run is positive, and has very high significance. However, this effect is almost extinct when 
public debt-to-GDP rises to about 67% of the total debt. Also, other variables such as trade openness 
measure, and the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP have their individual effects and are 
statistically significant in determining economic performance. 
 
Tujula and Guido (2004), investigated the variables that affects fiscal balance of OECD countries and 
found that amongst many variables, long-term nominal interest rates, rate of unemployment, real GDP 
growth, affects budget deficit. Also, certain political variables were found to be significant, such as 
election years, government type, whether democratic or military, as well as political stability in the 
country influences fiscal balance. Thus, the authors found that fiscal balance falls rapidly during 
election years. Furthermore, during economic recessions, asset prices adversely affects fiscal balance, 
and can be correlated with economic, political, and institutional set-ups in the country. According to 
Woo (2003), sociopolitical variables do not greatly affect government’s budget balance when there 
are sound institutional settings. 
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In addition, Mercan (2014), found that the sustainability of budget deficits matters in overall fiscal 
performance of a country. Using a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2012, the paper found 
that the ratio of budget deficit to GDP, and government’s general expenditure influences budget 
deficits, and for the sample selected, budget deficits were weakly sustainable over the period covered. 
Also, a sum up of these determinants of fiscal balance are not unconnected to the leading findings of 
Roubini and Sachs (1989). Their study gave strong support for both political and economic institutions 
as major determinants of fiscal balance. However, much emphasis is placed on the structure of the 
former having more influence. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), using a similar methodology for 20 
OECD countries, empirically found that ‘the number of spending ministers has a strong and very 
robust effect on expenditure, particularly during the period that includes the large macroeconomic 
shocks’ (p. 100). This means that government size is usually as a result of alliances in the electoral 
process, and these has potential causal impacts on fiscal performance. 
  
2.2.2. Literature on relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal balance 
On the other hand, several other studies have investigated the importance of a number of fiscal rules, 
such as expenditure or spending rules, revenue rules, as well as debt rules, as they influence fiscal 
performance of a country. Wijnbergen and Budina (2011), found that due to uncertainty in future flows 
of revenue and expenditure of the government, stock of debt, and primary deficits are adversely 
affected. This is particularly worst for natural resource rich countries, therefore, an establishment of 
“feedback rules” as it interacts with revenue from sale of natural resources, will help reduce the 
difference, and help alleviate deficits (p. 24). Such feedback rules therefore targets set levels of 
budgetary components, and can mitigate mismanagement of resources. This finding is consistent with 
Maliszewski (2009). The author showed that due to inconsistencies and rising production and 
adjustment costs of crude oil, welfare spending are delicate to models of fiscal rules, thus, revenue 
from non-oil activities should be distributed carefully given falling crude oil reserves. 
 
Hagen and Harden (1995) by showing an explanation for continually rising government debt, and 
therefore budget deficits in selected OECD countries, found that the budget process is highly 
uncertain, hence, the need for fiscal rules. However, their empirical results shows that commitment to 
rules, based on sound institutions is severely necessary, else, the government is lured into a fiscal 
illusion. In addition, Bohn and Inman (1996), selected a specific fiscal rule, i.e. balanced-budget rule, 
and drew evidence from states in the US. Historically, the US has recorded consistent deficit spending, 
and thus the authors investigated why this is so despite the fiscal rule in place. They found that given 
the several revenue sources available to the government, deficits can only be ameliorated if there are 
government spending cuts, rather than increases in taxes. Thus, while using selected economic and 
political controls, as well as a dummy measure for fiscal rule in their panel regressions, their results 
and conclusions shows that when a balanced-budget rule is set, the overall performance of such rules 
are at the mercy of legislative decisions, and in general the political atmosphere. 
 
2.3. Justification 
This paper is very important for oil dependent economies, and its findings would significantly 
contribute to the current literature. This paper is one of the few to interact fiscal rules with oil rents, 
and present pooled OLS, Fixed effects, and IV estimations in comparison, for two different set of 
classification of countries. 
  
The essence of this comparison is to comprehend the various under/overestimated causal effects of 
variables (determinants) on fiscal balance, and to highlight individual significance of macroeconomic 
variables, budgetary variables, and political variables into one category. Thus, the results of various 
estimation techniques from this paper will give new insights to the current literature on fiscal balance, 
welfare spending, debt-to-GDP effects, as well as the essence of fiscal rules in a unified framework, 
as against the conventional government budget constraint.  
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3. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
Based on the objective of this paper, to test the hypothesis stated, we make use of causal inference 
models with longitudinal data; linear dynamic panel model and static panel data estimators.  
 
Longitudinal/panel data is a distinct case of pooled time-series cross-section in which the same cross-
section such as entities (e.g. states, companies, individuals, and countries) is measured over time. In 
this study, the cross-section includes a sample of 20 selected oil dependent economies, and yearly 
observations of a number of variables were collected.  
 
In using panel data, we adjust for individual heterogeneity, get more informative data, as well as 
variability, efficiency and good degrees of freedom. Also, we benefit from less collinear relationship 
among regressors. This leads to the building and testing of more complex behavioral models, and 
longitudinal unit root tests that possess standard asymptotic distributions.   
 
A problem to overcome with panel data is the homogeneity assumption, and though formal tests exist 
that would evaluate its validity, there is a possibility of cross-sectional dependence that would 
complicate the analysis. As such, certain methods and tests need balanced panels and cross-country 
data consistency.  
 
Pre-Estimation 
The study presents the summary statistics of the variables used, scatter plot of these variables, and a 
correlation matrix. The study proceed to test for heteroskedasticity, and to decide on whether to use 
the fixed effects of random effects estimation techniques, after conducting the  Hausman specification 
test. Finally, the paper also carried out the test for Instrument Relevance, so as to apply the right and 
valid instrumental variable 
 
Estimation 
This study makes use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with pooled data, proceeds to applying either 
Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) estimation methods depending on Hausman specification 
test. The paper finally uses the instrumental variable approach based on two-stage least squares. These 
three econometric methods helps to confirm the robustness of the findings across distinct techniques. 
To start with, a simple strategy is to estimate the model in equation (1) and (2) using OLS regression. 
However, there are problems with this strategy. Two of these problems include; endogeneity problems 
which may be due to the capturing of reverse causality issue or the effect of some of the omitted 
variables (e.g., geographical characteristics, culture and so on); and the possibility of measurement 
error of our variables of interest (fiscal deficit and oil rents). This is because such errors will load into 
other variables. 
 
If not corrected, these two problems will yield OLS estimates that do not correspond to the causal 
effect of oil rents on fiscal balance. Thus, upward or downward biases are possible.  
 
The next strategy is therefore to use either the fixed effects or random effects panel data model. This 
model is reasonably effective to figure out the causes of changes within a sample.  Thus, the fixed or 
random effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the selected oil dependent 
economies, so that the estimated coefficients are unbiased because of omitted time-invariant 
characteristics such as fiscal rule or policy changes, budget structure, amongst others. 
 
As all the variables are time-invariant, this model is appropriate to establish a causal effect of oil rents 
on fiscal balance in oil dependent economics. The model is specified as follows: 
 
FBit = βi + β1ORit + γ0Zit + εit      
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where the dependent variable FBit stands for fiscal balance of country i in period t. ORit is the main 
variable of interest, and it is country i's oil rents in period t. Bi represents the country fixed-effect and 
Zi is a set of other control variables that includes Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per Capita, Government 
Expenditure (Size), Interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and control of corruption index 𝜀it 
stands for the error term. 
 
Despite the fact that the fixed or random effects techniques can solve individual as well as time effects 
and can adjust for heteroskedasticity, and they seem plausible compared to pooled OLS, they generally 
need certain assumptions to be fulfilled, for instance, strict exogeneity assumption.  
 
Thus, the shortcomings of RE and FE is that they are centered on country-specific effects and do not 
consider for stationarity, dynamics and endogeneity. 
 
Oil rents could be potentially endogenous in oil dependent economies’ fiscal balance regressions in 
the existence of omitted variables, measurement errors and reverse causality. For example, economic 
adjustments, changes in demographic characteristics of oil rigs and political regime changes or 
upheavals are potential to be omitted variables correlated with oil rents. 
  
Statistical estimation compounded with these challenges may yield inconsistent and biased estimates. 
In order to handle the potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and country fixed effects 
problems, this paper uses the instrumental variable approach based on using the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) with distinct and plausible instrument for oil rents.  
 
This instrument variable is share of world output. This is expected to be correlated with oil rents, but 
uncorrelated with any of the determinants of fiscal balance. It is also orthogonal to any other omitted 
characteristics (i.e. uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through any channel other than their 
effect via the endogenous variables).  
 
A successful instrumental variables approach would correct not only for the simultaneous and omitted 
variable biases but also for differential measurement error in the two endogenous variables as long as 
the measurement errors have the classical form (see Wooldridge, 2002) and thus, we can parameters 
consistently. 
 
The GMM is used to estimate the panel data for the larger data set, where N > T. Since it assumes 
strict exogeneity and stationarity restrictions, this paper obtains robust estimates from the dynamic 
linear panel, and also interacts fiscal rules with oil rents to capture the importance of fiscal rules in oil 
dependent economies. Furthermore, the paper uses two data samples; the first is with 20 countries for 
16years, while the second is with 61 countries for 25years. The latter is for selected net oil exporting 
countries, while the former is for selected oil dependent economies. 
 
Post-estimation diagnostics/robustness checks 
In order to confirm robustness, the study carried out the tests of endogeneity (Oil Rents are indeed 
endogenous or not), the first stage regression statistics, to test for weak instruments, and the tests of 
overidentifying restrictions, to test for instruments validity. 
 
3.2 Model specification 
We specify two models to examine oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance. The first model contains oil rents 
and a set of control variables. The baseline model to investigate oil dependent countries specific oil 
rent’s effect on fiscal balance takes the form: 
 
FBit = β0 + β1ORit + β2ORit*FRit + γ0Zit + εit                      ……………….. (6) 
 
where fiscal balance is the dependent variable defined by country’s budget deficit, OR is the oil rents, 
OR*FR is the interaction of oil rents and oil dependent countries with fiscal rule and Zi is a vector of 
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other economic control variables believed to influence fiscal balance. The control variables consist of 
Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per Capita, Government Expenditure (Size), Interest rate, unemployment 
rate, inflation rate, and control of corruption index. γ0 is a vector of coefficient estimates of the control 
variables, i= 1,….., N and t = 1,…..,T are correspondingly the distinct and temporal magnitudes of the 
panel, βi is the country fixed effects and εit is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
Furthermore, to cater for potential endogeneity of oil rents and all explanatory variables, the study 
introduce the instrumental variable model. Given the linear regression: 
 
a. Regress ORit on SWOit, and Zit to obtain OR^it estimate  ……………. (7) 
 
ORit = α0 + α1SWOit + γ0Zit + εit       ….………… (8) 
 
where SWOit is the instrumental variable 
b. Plug in the fitted values of ORit estimated derived from the equation (1) into the original linear 
regression equation 
 
FBit = β0 + β1OR^it + γ0Zit + εit      ….………… (9) 
 
where εit is a composite error term that is uncorrelated with ORit estimated and other regressors. 
 
In applying the dynamic panel (GMM-IV) technique to mitigate potential endogeneity of oil rents, the 
moment conditions whereby lags of the dependent variable – fiscal balance and the first differences 
of the exogenous variables – oil rents are instruments for the first-differenced equation. The equation 
to estimate is given as: 
 
FBit = αi + β1FBit-1 + β2ORit + γ0Zit + εit                           ….…………  (10) 
 
Where FBit-1 is lagged fiscal balance, which helps yield robustness in the dynamics of adjustment for 
fiscal balance, and we also specify another model to capture the interaction between oil rents and fiscal 
rules for all the samples selected.  
 
FBit = αi + β1FBit-1 + β2ORit + β3ORit*FRit + γ0Zit + εit       ….…………  (11) 
 
ORit*FRit captures the interaction between oil rents and fiscal balance. Also, to gratify for the 
possibility of cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity, and improve reliability and 
confidence level of the estimates, we apply the Driscoll-Kraay and the robust standard errors 
respectively. 
 
3.3. Definition of variables 
 
Table 1: Descriptions of dependent, independent, and policy variables 
 
Category Measured by Definition 
Outcome Variable 
(Fiscal Balance) 
Budget Balance – 
BB 
General government overall fiscal balance expressed as 
a percentage of GDP 
Policy Variable 
(Oil Rents) Oil Rents (OR) 
Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude 
oil production at world prices and total costs of 
production. Higher oil rents is expected to translate to 
lower deficits and an improved fiscal balance 
Control Variables Interest Rate 
Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- 
and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. 
This rate is normally differentiated according to 
creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of 
financing. The terms and conditions attached to these 
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rates differ by country, however, limiting their 
comparability. A high interest rate leads to low fiscal 
balance. Debts become expensive and fiscal balance 
poorly reacts (Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002). 
 
Unemployment 
Rate/Output 
growth/Output 
Gap 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that 
is without work but available for and seeking 
employment. This captures fiscal response to changes in 
the macro economy, as well as stabilization policies used 
during different cyclical fluctuations. Budget deficits 
would increase, leading to worsening fiscal balance in 
poor economic times for example. Hence, a negative 
relationship a priori. 
 Debt-to-GDP ratio (DGDP) 
The debt-to-GDP ratio measures the fiscal sustainability 
of the government. It is negatively related to fiscal 
balance. High DGDP leads to high interest payments and 
worsens budget balance. 
 Share of World Output (SWO) 
Oil production, 1000 bbl. per day as a share of total 
world output. 
Welfare level Real GDP per Capita 
In order to finance catching-up expenditure projects, 
government engage in deficit financing, which 
negatively affects overall fiscal balance (Woo, 2003) 
 Inflation (INF) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is 
generally used. In the literature, (Kontopoulos and 
Perotti, 1999), through price-indexation of receipts, 
inflation may erode competitiveness and risks causing 
pressures on exchange rates, and also negatively affect 
investment and growth, which determines fiscal 
performance in the end. 
 
Control of 
corruption 
(-2.5 weak; 2.5 
strong) 
The index for Control of Corruption captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and 
private interests. A weak index adversely affects fiscal 
balance. 
 Oil reserves, billion barrels 
Proved reserves of crude oil are the estimated quantities 
of all liquids defined as crude oil, which geological and 
engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty 
to be recoverable in future years from reservoirs under 
existing economic and operating conditions. 
 
Oil production, 
thousand barrels 
per day 
Oil production includes the production of crude oil 
(including lease condensate), natural gas plant liquids, 
and other liquids, and refinery processing gain. Negative 
values indicate a net refinery processing loss. 
 
3.4. Expected results 
 
Hypotheses 
i. Oil rents have positive impacts in determining the fiscal balance of an oil dependent 
economy, with or without fiscal rules 
ii. Welfare spending does not affect fiscal balance 
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iii. There is no significant difference between the effects of oil rents in dependent economies and 
net oil exporting countries 
 
Of all three variables identified in the literature, we expect Oil Rents to outperform the impact of rising 
real GDP per capita, control of corruption index, and falling debt-to-GDP on fiscal balance of oil 
dependent economies. In summary, this study will test the hypothesis that oil rents does affect fiscal 
rents in oil dependent countries, while observing other proven covariates. 
 
Table 2: Variables and expected signs 
Given the models specified in equations above, the variables’ expected coefficient results are as 
follows: 
Variable Expected Sign 
Oil Rents Positive 
Interest rate Negative 
Debt-to-GDP ratio Negative 
Share of World Output Positive 
Real GDP Positive 
Government Expenditure (Size) Negative 
Unemployment rate Negative 
Control of corruption Positive 
Inflation rate Negative 
 
3.5. Data and sources 
Data used in the regression model are described in this section. The dependent variable is the fiscal 
balance measured in constant dollars, from the International Monetary Fund (Fiscal Monitor) 2016. A 
set of control variables are also included to alleviate the effect of omitted variables bias; these include 
Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per Capita, Government Expenditure (Size), Interest rate, unemployment 
rate, inflation rate, and control of corruption index. Real GDP and Debt to GDP are specified in Natural 
logs. 
 
Data of 20 selected oil dependent economies, and 61 net oil exporting economies (all listed in the 
appendix), as classified by the World Bank; Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Angola, Oman, 
Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Chad, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Iran, UAE, Ecuador, Algeria, Nigeria, Russia, 
Qatar, Norway and Mexico within 2000 – 2015, and 1991 – 2015 respectively. All have annual data 
for the period under consideration, and all the variables are taken from International Monetary Fund, 
except Real GDP per capita constant and Oil rents, which are taken from WDI dataset 2015. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This section provides a detailed account of the pre-estimation tests carried out, findings obtained from 
employing pooled OLS, FE, IV/2SLS estimations, as well as the GMM-IV results obtained from 
equations 6 – 11, and robustness checks. The tables below shows general empirical results from 
regression established on the selected countries included in the sample, and in all regressions there is 
an interaction variable of oil rents with fiscal rules OR*FR to assess policy-specific effects. 
 
Pre-estimation diagnostics 
Summary Statistics 
The following table describes the summary of variables used for the various estimations carried out; 
pooled-OLS, Fixed effects, 2SLS IV, and GMM-IV methods of analysis. Summary statistics like 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are included.   
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fiscalbalance 1,525 -1.5564 7.92087 -151.3092 43.30262 320 4.2318 12.0617 -53.54418 43.30262 
Oilrents 1,525 9.7456 14.0988 0 67.19 320 29.9305 15.5642 1.3087 69.55 
Fiscalrule 1,525 0.2216 0.4154 0 1 320 0.2125 0.4097 0 1 
Debttogdpratio 1,525 50.4470 39.4886 .35 316.43 320 28.8846 30.8728 .318164 342.666 
Govtsize 1,525 16.2655 7.4090 2.06 83.25 320 15.0522 5.7363 4.16 42.51 
Intrate 1,522 6.9854 13.2696 -94.22 130.78 320 12.1945 12.2582 3.1 103.16 
Ur 1,525 8.2080 5.3079 .16 29.77 320 7.7609 5.4125 .3 29.9 
Realgdppercapita 1,525 16060.21 19246.78 257.11 91593.67 320 19526.16 23659.15 462.49 91593.6 
Infrate 1,525 51.3928 649.0846 -10.6 23773.1 320 9.8253 24.1002 -10.0675 324.997 
Controlofcorruption 1,514 0.0165 1.0816 -2.06 2.55 320 -0.3582 .97331 -1.69 2.3 
Shareofworldoutput 1,525 1.4872 3.7802 .01 27.89 320 4.0650 5.2230 .07 25.88 
Logrgdp 1,525 8.8388 1.4287 5.5495 11.4251 320 9.1918 1.2221 6.1366 11.4251 
Logdgdp 1,525 3.6246 0.8557 -1.0498 5.757102 320 2.9031 1.0716 -1.1451 5.836756 
Oilrents*Fiscalrule 1,525 1.5020 6.322 0 62.17 320 4.1847 9.1239 0 39.33 
 
Note: The values in italics in table 3 are data of the sample of 20 oil dependent countries employed in the study 
 
From the data, the mean of all net oil exporting countries is negative, and these group of countries 
have even larger deficits or fiscal balance, compared to the heavily oil dependent countries. In fact, 
countries in the Middle East, and in Africa have fiscal balance above the country averages. However, 
no low or middle income country has fiscal balance close to the mean of any of the OECD countries 
included in the larger sample. 
 
In the case of oil rents, oil dependent countries have country averages larger than selected net oil 
exporting countries. Thus, the large amount of oil rents for the former can be considered as a 
justification for their dependency on crude oil revenues in budgetary decisions.  
 
Bin scatter plots 
In order to understand the link between fiscal balance and oil rents, the study utilizes the bin scatter 
plots, which is a non-parametric approach of understanding the link among variables. Since the bin 
scatter plot first groups oil rents into equal-sized bins, and then computes the averages of fiscal balance 
and oil rents within each bin, the scatterplot created is representative of the behaviour of the 
population, not just the selected samples included in this study (Chetty et al., 2013; Stepner, 2014) 
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Panel A: Fiscal balance and oil rents for net oil exporting countries 
 
(I) 
 
(II) 
 
 
Figure 2: Bin scatter plots of fiscal balance and oil rents 
 
Graph (I) includes a dummy variable i.e. fiscal rules, and plots the bin scatter points, showing that 
without fiscal rules, the scatter points are dispersed around the regression line, but tight to the 
regression line when there are fiscal rules. This mean that the slope is imprecisely estimated without 
fiscal rules, and regression standard error is large, but is otherwise with the presence of fiscal rule. 
 
We include the control of corruption index in Graph (II). This is useful, as it accommodates a control 
for covariates before plotting the relationship. Thus it shows the relationship between fiscal balance 
and oil rents, when we control for the corruption index. As shown above, given that the binned scatter 
points are tight to the regression line, the slope is precisely estimated, whether there is fiscal rule or 
not, hence, the regression standard error is small, which indicates statistical significance. 
 
Panel B: Fiscal balance and oil rents for oil dependent countries 
 
(III) 
 
(IV) 
 
 
For Oil dependent economies, graph (III) shows a positive relationship between fiscal balance and oil 
rents. This positive relationship is however steeper when there is fiscal rules. It is almost constant, and 
may be statistically insignificant without adding any covariates. However, in graph (IV), the bin scatter 
points, shows a positive relationship between fiscal balance and oil rents, when we include a covariate. 
The dispersion of bin scatter points across the line is however uncertain and is shown in several 
regression estimates that follows in subsequent sections of this paper. One obvious point to note is that 
the strength and direction of relationship between fiscal balance and oil rents is affected when other 
covariates are included. 
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Correlation matrix 
Table 4.2 shows Pearson correlations for selected variables. All the independent variables selected are 
significantly related to fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries. However, in oil dependent 
economies, government spending is insignificantly related to fiscal balance. 
 
Also, in oil dependent economies, apart from debt-to-GDP ratio, real GDP per capita and control of 
corruption index, the association with fiscal balance is not very strong, but large sample feature, and 
control of cross country dependence may induce the statistical signiﬁcance of each.  
 
The strongest association is between control of corruption index and our selected measure of welfare 
spending i.e. real GDP per capita. The flow of government spending on welfare to the improvement 
in life expectancy and general welfare of citizens is mostly hampered by corruption in many oil-rich 
economies. Thus, as expected, the more corruption is controlled for, the more welfare improvement 
an economy enjoys.  
 
As expected also, the sign of the association between debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal balance is negative, 
and is established in both group of sample countries. 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for selected variables 
    
Panel (A) – For selected net oil exporting countries 
 
 Fiscal Balance OilRents GovtSize logRGDP logDGDP 
Control of 
Corruption 
Fiscal 
Balance 1.0000      
OilRents 0.3682* 1.0000     0.0000      
GovtSize -0.1584* 0.0088 1.0000    0.0000 0.7301     
logRGDP 0.1233* -0.0351 0.4107* 1.0000   0.0000 0.1712 0.0000    
logDGDP -0.0562* -0.0801* -0.0368 -0.0735* 1.0000  0.0282 0.0018 0.1509 0.0041   
Control of 
Corruption 
0.0639* -0.2601* 0.2701* 0.6878* 0.0456 1.0000 
0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760  
 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
Panel (B) – For selected oil dependent countries 
 
 Fiscal Balance OilRents GovtSize logRGDP logDGDP 
Control of 
Corruption 
Fiscal Balance 1.0000       
OilRents 0.2259*   1.0000     0.0000      
GovtSize 0.0774    0.1365*   1.0000     0.1674    0.0145     
logRGDP 0.4574*  -0.1348*   0.3967* 1.0000    0.0000    0.0158    0.0000    
logDGDP -0.3865*  -0.1002   -0.0740 -0.2874* 1.0000   0.0000    0.0736    0.1868 0.0000   
Control of 
Corruption 
0.4598*  -0.2676*   0.3014* 0.8403* -0.1899*   1.0000  
0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0006  
 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level  
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Test for cross-sectional dependence 
Given that cross-sectional dependence (CD), and contemporaneous correlation, is usually in macro 
panels that spans above 15-30 years, we conduct the Pesaran’s CD test. This helps us to test whether 
the residuals are correlated across entities in the samples selected to represent oil dependent countries, 
so as to avoid bias in tests results (a.k.a. contemporaneous correlation).  
 
Table 5: Tests for cross-sectional dependence 
 
H0: Residuals are not correlated Selected oil dependent economies All Net Exporting Countries 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional 
independence  2.885, Pr. = 0.0039 11.645, Pr. = 0.0000 
Average absolute value of the off-
diagonal elements  0.303 0.291 
 
Since the P. value < 0.5, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that there is cross-sectional 
dependence among selected oil dependent economies. Hence, we proceed to use the Driscoll and 
Kraay standard errors, which is a robust standard error for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence. 
 
Standard hausman test 
Here, the null hypothesis of no ﬁxed eﬀects has to be rejected at the 10% level. Because of the marginal 
rejection of the null hypothesis, the regression model in the model specification section of this paper 
(equation 6) should be estimated by ﬁxed eﬀects regression to ensure consistency of the results. 
 
Table 6: Result of hausman tests 
 
H0: Difference in coefficients 
not systemic Oil Dependent Economies Net Oil Exporting Countries 
Chi2 16.74 0.0529 
Prob > Chi2 79.10 0.0000 
 
An argument for the RE-FGLS 
Although pooled OLS regression yields consistent coeﬃcient estimates when the random eﬀects 
model is true, its coeﬃcient estimates are ineﬃcient under the null hypothesis of the Hausman test. 
Therefore, pooled OLS regression should not be used when testing for ﬁxed eﬀects. Because feasible 
GLS estimation is both consistent and eﬃcient, respectively, under the null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test, it is more appropriate to compare the coeﬃcient estimates obtained from FGLS with those of the 
FE estimator (Hoechle, 2009). Due to numerical reasons, Wooldridge (2002) recommends to perform 
the Hausman test for ﬁxed eﬀects with either the ﬁxed eﬀects or the random eﬀects estimates of the 
error. Thanks to the Hausman command’s option sigmamore, Stata makes it simple to perform a 
standard Hausman test in the way suggested by Wooldridge (2002) 
 
Provided that the Hausman test applied here is valid (which it probably is not), the null hypothesis of 
no ﬁxed-eﬀects is rejected on the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Therefore, the standard Hausman test leads 
to the conclusion that pooled OLS estimation is likely to produce inconsistent coeﬃcient estimates for 
the regression model in (10). As a result, the regression model in (10) should be estimated by ﬁxed 
eﬀects (within) regression. 
 
Estimations 
Given that the data collated are separated into oil dependent economies, and a larger set to cover for 
Net oil exporting countries, we present the results in two separate categories, and proceed to compare 
these estimations, and confirm consistencies, as well as robustness for each class of estimations. 
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Oil Dependent Countries  
 
Pooled OLS 
For the pooled-OLS estimation, we classify the variables as they influence fiscal balance alongside 
the policy variable, oil rents. 
 
Table 7: Pooled OLS Estimation results 
 
Dependent Variable = Fiscal Balance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Model 1 
Policy + 
Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Model 2 
Macroeconomic + 
Budgetary 
Variables 
Model 3 
All Variables + Political 
Variables 
Oil Rents 0.284*** 0.265*** 0.305*** (0.0797) (0.0624) (0.0668) 
Interest Rate 0.0872 0.156* 0.145** (0.0626) (0.0746) (0.0596) 
Unemployment Rate -0.581** -0.462** -0.312 (0.221) (0.203) (0.226) 
Inflation Rate -0.0913* -0.0688 -0.0478 (0.0476) (0.0526) (0.0437) 
logRGDP 3.843*** 4.548*** 1.453* (0.413) (0.601) (0.720) 
Govtsize  -0.372*** -0.372***  (0.0930) (0.0749) 
logDGDP  -2.327*** -2.671***  (0.289) (0.261) 
Control of Corruption   5.064***   (1.211) 
Oilrents*Fiscalrule -0.0376 -0.0626 0.0355 (0.0621) (0.0559) (0.0601) 
Constant -35.09*** -30.54*** -2.124 (4.990) (5.946) (6.066) 
Observations 320 320 320 
R-squared 0.365 0.422 0.457 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 
 
Notes: The Drisc/Kraay Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicates significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (i.e. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
In order to mitigate omitted variables bias, the paper included several relevant control variables that 
influences fiscal balance in an economy. However, in this paper, we categorize them into 
macroeconomic variables, budgetary variables, and political variables. These variables are perceived 
to influence fiscal balance of any economy. Also, in order to highlight the influence of oil rents, it is 
pertinent to further consider the presence of fiscal rules or not. Hence, we include the interaction term, 
where fiscal rule – expenditure rule, debt rule, or revenue usage rules according to IMF classifications 
- is a dummy (1 = presence of at least one form of fiscal rule, and 0 = absence of any form of fiscal 
rule). 
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Fixed Effects and IV Estimations 
 
Table 8: Fixed Effects and IV estimation results 
 
Dependent variable = Fiscal Balance 
 Pooled OLS Estimation 
All Variables + Political  
Variables 
Fixed effects 
Estimation 
IV/2SLS 
Estimation 
Oil Rents 0.305*** 0.395 0.293 (0.0668) (4.81)** (5.41)** 
Government Size 0.145** -0.660 -0.379 (0.0596) (1.98) (3.39)** 
Interest Rate -0.312 0.275 0.147 (0.226) (3.56)** (2.53)* 
Unemployment Rate -0.0478 0.233 -0.309 (0.0437) (0.37) (1.40) 
Inflation Rate 1.453* -0.056 -0.047 (0.720) (1.40) (1.20) 
logRGDP -0.372*** 12.747 1.658 (0.0749) (2.78)* (2.04)* 
logDGDP -2.671*** -0.737 -2.662 (0.261) (0.93) (4.24)** 
Control of Corruption 5.064*** 6.801 4.789 (1.211) (1.83) (4.24)** 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule 0.0355 -0.030  (0.0601) (0.41)  
_cons -2.124 -102.333 -3.560 (6.066) (2.38)* (0.46) 
R2 0.457 0.59 0.46 
Observations 320 320 320 
Number of countries 20 20 20 
 
Drisc/Kraay Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Fixed Effects method is preferred for the estimation of the fiscal balance equation based on the Hausman test 
(Prob>Chi2 = 0.0529). Time dummies are omitted from the table 
 
In general, the results are consistent with the empirical evidence documented in the literature. Oil rent 
is highly significant at 1% level in the pooled OLS, fixed effects and IV/2SLS estimations with the 
inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficient of this variable is 0.305 in the pooled OLS and 0.4 
in the fixed effects estimation. This imply that 1% increase in oil rents will increase fiscal balance by 
+0.305% and +0.4% respectively in oil dependent economies. The interaction term 
(Oilrents*FiscalRule) is not significant. This means that the presence of fiscal rule does not have any 
influence on fiscal balance in oil dependent countries. Hence, whether rules that curtails spending, 
borrowings or the use of oil revenue especially during peak periods exists or not, fiscal balance is 
irresponsive to such changes. 
 
When we consider the endogeneity problem, and estimate using the IV/2SLS approach, the estimate 
for oil rents decreases to +0.3% increase in fiscal balance for a 1% change in oil rents in oil dependent 
economies, and the interaction term is excluded. We considered country-specific and time-specific 
effects in the fixed effects model, and note that a 1% increase in oil rents increases the fiscal balance 
by 0.3%. 
 
In the case of other variables, of interest is the real GDP per capita. This is because it captures the 
efforts of the government to boost welfare and better the lives of its citizens. Also, another variable of 
interest is the effects on fiscal balance of the control of corruption index. Government size is only 
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significant in two regressions, 5% level in pooled OLS and15% level in the IV/2SLS regressions. 
Interest rate is significant at 5% in both the fixed effects and the IV/2SLS regressions. As expected 
log RGDP per capita is significant in three regressions, at 1% level in pooled OLS, 5% level in both 
fixed effects and IV/2SLS estimations with and without the interaction terms respectively.  
 
The control of corruption index is significant at 1% in the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS regressions. The 
effect of a 1% change in the estimated coefficient of this variable on fiscal balance ranges between 
+4.8% and +6.8%. Debt-to-GDP ratio is an important budget item, and it is statistically significant in 
the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS regressions. Thus, a 1% increase in debt-to-GDP ratio, reduces fiscal 
balance by 2.67% and 2.66% in the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS regressions respectively.  
 
Net Oil Exporting Countries 
We estimate all countries first with the famous pooled OLS techniques, and control for country-
specific and time-specific effects 
 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and IV/2SLS estimations 
 
Table 9: Pooled OLS, fixed effects, and IV/2SLS estimation results 
 
 Pooled OLS Estimation 
All Variables + Political 
Variables 
Fixed effects 
Estimation 2SLS/IV Estimation 
Oil Rents 0.239 0.466 0.181 (5.36)** (12.12)** (4.95)** 
Government Size -0.289 -0.452 -0.283 (2.18)* (12.36)** (2.25)* 
Interest Rate -0.031 -0.018 -0.041 (1.94) (1.18) (2.95)** 
Unemployment Rate -0.153 0.051 -0.151 (2.00) (0.69) (2.85)** 
Inflation Rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.77) (0.67) (0.43) 
logRGDP 0.989 2.957 1.092 (3.59)** (2.86)** (3.94)** 
logDGDP -0.242 -0.563 -0.270 (0.95) (2.16)* (1.19) 
Control of Corruption 0.769 0.740 0.491 (1.85) (2.38)* (1.72) 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule -0.119 -0.192 -0.087 (2.90)** (4.49)** (2.13)* 
Constant -5.393 -25.552 -5.727 (3.27)** (2.85)** (2.72)** 
R2 0.24 0.44 0.23 
Observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 
 
Drisc/Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Given a larger dataset, the results are consistent with the empirical evidence documented in the 
literature, and the interaction term is significant in all the techniques used. This means that fiscal rules 
matter for net oil exporting countries, and influences fiscal balance through the oil rents. Oil rent is 
highly significant at 1% level in the pooled OLS, fixed effects and IV/2SLS estimations with the 
inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficient of this variable is however lower than for the oil 
dependent economies, but higher in the fixed-effects estimations. The least square dummy variable 
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(LSDV) approach for fixed effects estimations used showed that an increase in oil rents by 1% 
increases fiscal balance by 0.47%, but drastically reduces in the IV/2SLS estimations.  
 
The interaction term (Oilrents*FiscalRule) is statistically significant. This means that the presence of 
fiscal rule does have some influence on fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries. Hence, when 
rules that curtails spending, borrowings or the use of oil revenue especially during peak periods exists, 
fiscal balance is responsive to such changes. 
 
When we consider the endogeneity problem, and estimate using the IV/2SLS approach, the estimate 
for oil rents decreases to +0.18% increase in fiscal balance for a 1% change in oil rents in selected net 
oil exporting economies. We considered country-specific and time-specific effects in the fixed effects 
model, and note that a 1% increase in oil rents increases the fiscal balance by 0.47%. 
 
Government size is significant in all three regressions, a 1% increase in government spending reduces 
fiscal balance by 0.29%, 0.45%, and 0.28% in the pooled OLS, fixed effects, and IV/2SLS estimations 
respectively. Interest rate is significant at 5% in the 2SLS estimation, and a 1% increase in the real 
interest rate reduces fiscal balance by 0.04%. For RGDP per capita, a 1% increase, raises the fiscal 
balance by 0.1%, and is significant at 1% level in all three regressions.  
 
The control of corruption index is significant at 1% only in the fixed effects estimation, and a 1% 
increase, raises fiscal balance by 0.74%. Unemployment rate is also significant only in the IV/2SLS 
estimation, and a percent increase in Ur, reduces fiscal balance by 0.15%. Debt-to-GDP ratio is only 
statistically significant in the fixed-effects estimation, and a percent rise, leads to 0.26% decrease in 
fiscal balance. 
 
Generalized methods of moment (GMM) 
Given our larger dataset, the GMM technique works to eliminate serial correlation, it works to 
eliminate heteroskedasticity, and it also covers the endogeneity problem. It can be used for all forms 
of data including panel data, and is efficient when we have less time periods compared with cross 
sections over time (i.e. T < or = N). The advantages of GMM over the instrumental variables (IV) 
approach are clear: if heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the 
simple IV estimator. Also, GMM dynamic panel estimation is capable to correct for unobserved 
country heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, measurement error, and endogeneity problems (Bond et 
al., 2001; Caselli et al., 1996). 
 
Table 10: GMM-IV Estimations 
 
Dependent Variable  = Fiscal Balance 
 GMM-IV without Fiscal rules GMM-IV with Fiscal rules 
L.FiscalBalance 0.533 0.520 (3.76)** (4.27)** 
Oil Rents 0.375 0.410 (3.69)** (2.73)** 
Government Size 0.267 0.198 (0.48) (0.42) 
Interest Rate -0.363 -0.356 (2.56)* (2.89)** 
Unemployment Rate 0.007 0.019 (0.01) (0.02) 
Inflation Rate 0.005 0.003 (0.42) (0.45) 
logRGDP -0.709 -0.405 (0.16) (0.10) 
logDGDP 0.741 0.765 
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(0.31) (0.31) 
Control of Corruption -3.632 -3.572 (1.10) (1.12) 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule  -0.196  (0.31) 
Observations 1,385 1,385 
Number of country 61 61 
 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The GMM-IV estimations are conducted for the all net oil exporting countries sample, with the 
interaction term (OilRents*FiscalRule), and also without the interaction term. In using this approach, 
we pay a higher cost in terms of the significance of a number of variables. However, as regards the 
policy variable of interest (Oil Rents), it is significant in the presence or absence of fiscal rules, and a 
rise by 1% increases fiscal balance by 0.38% in the GMM without fiscal rules, while an increase of 
1% raises fiscal balance by 0.41% in the presence of fiscal rules using the panel dynamic estimation 
method with fiscal rules. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant across fiscal balance 
in both GMM, suggesting a critical past effect on the present level of fiscal balance in oil exporting 
countries. 
 
For the test of included covariates, government size is insignificant in both GMM, as well as 
unemployment rate (UR), inflation rate, real GDP per capita, debt-to-GDP ratio, and the control of 
corruption index. However, the interest rate is statistically significant in both GMM, and a 1% increase 
reduces fiscal balance by 0.36% with or without fiscal rules. Lastly, the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant across fiscal balance in both GMM, suggesting an important and critical past 
effect of fiscal balance on the level of fiscal balance.   
 
GMM-IV Diagnostics Conducted 
The Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions which tests for overall validity of the 
instruments and the null hypothesis is that all instruments as a group are exogenous. Therefore, higher 
p-values are desirable to reject the null, and as it is in this paper, Prob > chi2 = 0.216. 
 
The second test examines the null hypothesis that error term of the differenced equation is not serially 
correlated particularly at the second order (AR2). We do not reject the null hypothesis of these tests 
in this case, since Pr > z = 0.866. 
 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D. (ShareofWorldOutput ShareofWorld) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L (4/24). (FiscalBalance OilRents) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences: z = -1.47 Pr > z = 0.142 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z =   0.17 Pr > z = 0.866 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. Restrictions: chi2 (34)   = 58.50 Prob > chi2 = 0.006 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
  Hansen test of overid. Restrictions: chi2 (34)   = 40.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.216 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  IV (ShareofWorldOutput ShareofWorld) 
  Hansen test excluding group:     chi2 (32)   = 37.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.236 
  Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2 (2)    =   2.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.249 
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Post-estimation tests/robustness checks 
 
Instrumental Variables: Justification 
To provisionally accept our instrumental variable (IV) as valid, this paper starts by investigating 
whether oil rent is indeed endogenous. Thus, it is important to detect variables in the error term that 
correlates with oil rents. Generally, many variables in the error term may correlate with oil rents, thus 
it is potentially difficult to identify a good IV. Also, since endogeneity isn’t only about such 
correlations, the concern is if the candidate IV is not correlated with fiscal balance. 
  
The verbal argument for share of world oil reserves as a valid IV is that oil rich economies do not 
consider amongst other budgetary items, oil reserves, but instead projected oil price. Thus, in the 
production/drilling/extraction cost of crude oil, and the revenue from the sale of crude oil, which are 
the determinants of oil rents, the country’s share of world reserves is considered in the cost, but export 
price of crude oil is most significant in the revenue part of oil rents. Thus, the selected IV (i.e. the 
country’s share of world crude oil reserves) has no correlation with other observable characteristics of 
fiscal balance, but is significantly correlated with oil rents, which is assumed to be potentially 
endogenous, and affects fiscal balance only through oil rents. 
 
Table 11: IV: Test for instrument relevance 
 
 OilRents 
Share of World Output 1.608 (18.65)** 
_cons 7.354 (21.00)** 
R2 0.19 
N 1,525 
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Test of endogeneity (Oil Rents are indeed endogenous or not) 
H0: variables are exogenous: The null hypothesis is that we could have just used regular pooled OLS 
or the fixed effects regression without necessarily using IV regression. 
 
Table 12: Tests of endogeneity 
 
Selected Oil Dependent economies Net Oil Exporting Economies 
Durbin (score) chi2 (1) = .060299  
(p = 0.8060) 
Durbin (score) chi2(1) =  4.09414  
 (p = 0.0430) 
Wu-Hausman F (1,310) = .058426  
(p = 0.8092) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,1500) =  4.07538   
(p = 0.0437) 
Robust score chi2 (1) = .056565  
(p = 0.8120) 
Robust score chi2(1)  =  2.73896   
(p = 0.0979) 
Robust regression F (1,310) = .054772  
(p = 0.8151) 
Robust regression F(1,1500) =   3.0852   
(p = 0.0792) 
 
Both the Durbin (score) statistics as well as the Wu-Hausman statistic have very large p-values which 
tells us that we do not reject the null hypothesis that Oil rents are exogenous, and not endogenous. 
 
First stage regression statistics (for weak instruments) 
Here we report the first-stage regression statistic in order to look for weak instruments, i.e. the 
correlation between the instruments and the supposed endogenous variable i.e. Oil Rents. We are 
interested in the Partial R-squared which measures the correlation between oil rents and share of world 
output after we have partial out the effects of other control variables.  
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Since the Partial R-squared is 58% and our robust F-statistic is 130.669, which is much larger than 
any of the critical values shown in our table, we reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are 
weak. This suggests that we have good instruments in this case. 
 
Table 13: First stage regression statistics 
 
H0: Instruments are weak 
Variable: Oil Rents 
Selected Oil Dependent 
Economies Net Oil Exporting Economies 
R-squared 0.6668 0.3561 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6549 0.3518 
Partial R-squared 0.5839 0.1966 
Robust  F (4, 308)130.669 96.9266 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
# of endogenous regressors 1 1 
# of excluded instruments 4 2 
 
Test of overidentifying restrictions (for instruments validity) 
Here, the p-values for the Sargan as well as the Basmann tests are large which suggests that our 
instruments are valid and that our models are correctly specified. 
 
Table 14: Test of Overidentifying restrictions 
 
Selected Oil dependent economies Net Oil Exporting countries 
Sargan chi2 (3)  = 34.5295 (p = 0.0000) Sargan chi2 (1) = 42.9081 (p = 0.0000) 
Basmann chi2 (3) = 37.2546 (p = 0.0000) Basmann chi2 (1) = 43.8407 (p = 0.0000) 
Score chi2 (3)= 14.8166 (p = 0.0020) Score chi2 (1) = 7.74959 (p = 0.0054) 
 
Connecting the importance of fiscal rules for the effectiveness of oil rents in improving fiscal 
balance 
Inferring from the findings of this study, we can deduce that oil rents is more effective in improving 
fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries, and fiscal rule is significant, as compared to the category 
of highly oil dependent economies, where fiscal rule is insignificant in all estimation technique 
employed to overcome empirical challenges. This ineffectiveness of fiscal rules (Debt, Revenue, and 
Government expenditure – Size) must have been attributable to overreliance on crude oil, 
inappropriate application, and untimely adoption of IMF’s framework on fiscal policies and strategies 
by less self-reliant countries. Thus, these countries are largely exposed to external oil price shocks, 
and suffer from internal fiscal crisis, in the event of rising crude oil exploration costs, alongside falling 
revenue. 
 
The key decision that underscores the establishment of fiscal rules arises from the trends in fiscal 
balance/Budget deficits of countries overtime. Deficits maintained a high hand in public finance, and 
thus necessitated the need for fiscal adjustments in order to standardize fiscal sustainability. Moreover, 
the rationale behind such reasoning is that government’s finances responds to set budget constraints, 
external shocks – input or output, price shocks, past/lagged fiscal balances of the government, and the 
political will to support or not to spending for high categories of spending ministries, agencies, or 
parastatal, such as defense, welfare, education, amongst others. 
 
It is worth noting that the simple view of fiscal rules is that a substantial part of budgetary items, be 
limited, and a fiscal indicator be used to monitor the reaction of government’s finances overtime. 
Hence, policy makers should reiterate the need for the government to set up, and follow religiously, 
standardized fiscal balance rules, debt rules, expenditure or government size rules, and revenue usage 
rules. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study achieved its main objective of investigating oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance in the presence 
of fiscal rules for oil dependent economies, and for selected net oil exporting countries, while 
controlling for the effects of some macroeconomic, budgetary, and political variables, such as 
government size, interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, real GDP per capita, debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and control of corruption. The study relied on the strengths of past studies like those of  Tujula 
and Guido (2004) by establishing the specific effects of oil rents for crude oil endowed economies, as 
one of the main determinants of fiscal balance. This establishes the importance of oil rents, amongst 
other previously identified macroeconomic, budgetary, and political covariates. Thus, we have 
attempted to overcome the shortcomings of studies that make generalized conclusions for the main 
determinants of fiscal balance for all countries, without highlighting specific variables that takes a 
huge chunk of the effects for specific natural resource endowed economies.   
 
Given large macroeconomic panel dataset, our empirical analysis solved the possibility of 
endogeneity, simultaneity bias and unobserved heterogeneity of oil rents and fiscal balance by the 
main econometric technique i.e. using an instrumental variable approach based on Dynamic Panel 
estimators or the General Method of Moment (GMM). This is used in comparison with estimations 
from pooled OLS, LSDV fixed effects, and the IV/2SLS techniques (using each country’s share of 
world output as instrument). Our pre-estimation diagnostics showed that the GMM approach may not 
be applicable to the small sample, and we suspected that the IV/2SLS method may also be weak in 
testing our hypothesis for the oil dependent economies with N = 20 and T = 16, and therefore we 
maintained the LSDV Fixed effects estimations as our main result for this category of sample countries 
selected. We also utilized the Drisc/Kraay standard errors, as well as the robust standard errors, which 
are standard errors robust to cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity of unknown forms 
respectively, that exists in large macroeconomic panel data where N > T. 
 
Our estimation results shows that in countries with fiscal rules, there is insignificant reaction of fiscal 
balance to changes in oil rents shocks, and the impact is weak. We find also that welfare spending, 
which was captured by the real GDP per capita, affects fiscal balance, and so does the budgetary 
variable, i.e. debt-to-GDP ratio, and the ability of the government to curb corruption and 
mismanagement of funds, which is politically motivated. 
 
5.2. Lessons for policy 
The findings suggest that oil rents, government spending, welfare related spending, and the level of 
corruption, have significantly influenced the amount of budget deficits from 1991 – 2015 in countries 
with at least one form of fiscal rules. The findings have some implications for policymakers, for fiscal 
management and fiscal sustainability in resource rich countries. First, highlighting the unpredictability 
of crude oil price shocks, especially the timing, and external economic effects is important, and thus 
should not be a budgetary variable. 
 
In mid-2015, due to the oil price glut, several countries (including Nigeria, and other oil-rich sub-
Saharan African countries) responded negatively with fall in fiscal sustainability, fiscal crisis, and 
eventually economic recession. Although global growth rate of GDP has been on the decline, in almost 
oil dependent economies, and investment costs had been on the increase in many countries, oil rents 
had inevitably improved in the years prior to 2015. This suggests therefore that, had basic 
macroeconomic, budgetary, and political fundamentals been adequately catered for, fiscal balance 
would have improved in the period of falling oil rents. 
 
Aside from oil rents, oil dependent economies should pay attention to the use of fiscal rules, to reduce 
budget deficits. This finding highlights the significance of other variables asides from our policy 
variable to influence fiscal balance. Accordingly, other policy implications consist of focusing on 
adequate environment for investors in oil and gas sectors, which includes favourable long-term and 
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short-term lending rates, and corruption reducing efforts in public and private sector services, as well 
as improving the overall basics of economic performance indicators. 
 
For recurrent spending, borrowing should not be encouraged, except where such loans are carved for 
capital projects that yields ripple effects in the overall economy. This will limit the size of the 
government, and put the primary balance of the government in a reasonable shape.  
 
5.3. Limitations of the study 
This study is not without limitations. First, we could not include some of the key determinants of fiscal 
balance that splits among macroeconomic, budgetary, and political variables due to the absence of 
complete time-series data for the years under consideration. Second, we certainly acknowledge the 
fact that some other changes have since taken place in the composition of crude oil reserves and the 
computation of oil rents in the net oil exporting countries, including the new focus on shale oil and 
other forms of energy sources that might have influenced our estimates. Nevertheless, we make an 
effort to control for these changes through the inclusion of country and time fixed effects, our estimates 
may still show minor biases due to these changes. 
 
Third, the dataset we use is aggregate annual data at the national level. It will be useful to further 
consider household-level data to examine the disaggregated welfare effects of falling fiscal balance 
on the unit level. This is a possible extension for future research in oil dependent economies. Despite 
the above concerns, the present study significantly enhances our understanding of the role of oil rents 
on fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of Net Oil exporting countries included in the study 
 
1 Algeria* 31 Kuwait* 
2 Angola* 32 Libya* 
3 Argentina 33 Lithuania 
4 Australia 34 Malaysia 
5 Azerbaijan, Republic of* 35 Mexico* 
6 Bangladesh 36 Mongolia 
7 Belarus 37 Netherlands 
8 Bolivia 38 New Zealand 
9 Brazil 39 Nigeria* 
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10 Cameroon 40 Norway* 
11 Canada 41 Oman* 
12 Chad* 42 Pakistan 
13 China, P.R.: Mainland 43 Papua New Guinea 
14 Colombia 44 Peru 
15 Cote d'Ivoire 45 Philippines 
16 Czech Republic 46 Poland 
17 Denmark 47 Qatar* 
18 DR Congo 48 Romania 
19 Ecuador* 49 Russian Federation* 
20 Egypt 50 Saudi Arabia* 
21 France 51 Slovak Republic 
22 Germany 52 South Africa 
23 Ghana 53 Spain 
24 Greece 54 Sudan 
25 Hungary 55 Thailand 
26 Indonesia 56 United Arab Emirates* 
27 Iran, Islamic Republic of* 57 United Kingdom 
28 Israel 58 United States 
29 Italy 59 Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de* 
30 Kazakhstan* 60 Vietnam 
  61 Yemen, Republic of 
 
Brunei Darussalam* and Iraq* are also considered among the oil dependent economies II *Oil Dependent 
Economies 
 
